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RECENT CASES

I

ALIEN HEIRS-IRON CURTAIN STATUTES AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVASION OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Zschernig v. Miller,389 U.S. 429 (1968)
An Oregon resident died intestate in 1962 owning real and
personal property with his sole heirs residing in the Soviet-occupied zone of East Germany. A representative of the alien heirs
began proceedings to recover the property, but failed to establish
the existence of reciprocal rights of inheritance between East
Germany and the United States which was required by state statute as a condition precedent to recovery by alien heirs.' The
State of Oregon through its State Land Board requested that the
property be escheated to the state. The orphans court agreed and
made the appropriate order. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Oregon held that a treaty between the United States and Germany 2 which granted inheritance rights in real property to Ger1. (1) The right of an alien not residing within the United
States or its territories to take either real or personal property or
the proceeds thereof in this state by succession or testamentary
disposition, upon the same terms and conditions as inhabitants and
citizens of the United States, is dependent in each case:
(a) Upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of
citizens of the United States to take real and personal property
and the proceeds thereof upon the same terms and conditions as
inhabitants and citizens of the country of which such alien is an
inhabitant or citizen;
(b) Upon the rights of citizens of the United States to receive
by payment to them within the United States or its territories
money originating from the estates or persons dying within such
foreign country; and
(c) Upon proof that such foreign heirs, distributees, devisees
or legatees may receive the benefit, use or control of money or
property from estates of persons dying in this state without confiscation, in whole or in part, by the governments of such foreign
countries.
(2) The burden is upon such nonresident alien to establish
the fact of existence of the reciprocal rights set forth in subsection
(1) of this section.
(3) If such reciprocal rights are not found to exist and if no
heir, devisee or legatee other than such alien is found eligible to
take such property, the property shall be disposed of as escheated
property.
Os. REv. STAT. § 111.070 (1967).
2. Treaty with Germany, Dec. 8, 1923, art. IV, 44 Stat. 2132, 2135,
Treaty of June 3, 1935, 49 Stat. 3258. The intervening war with Germany
did not destroy the treaty. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947). Therefore
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man nationals without recourse to reciprocity was a higher and
controlling law. 3 While recognizing the present impossibility of
transferring property to the heirs, 4 their ownership in the real
property as established by the treaty was superior to the state's
right of escheat, despite lack of reciprocity. However, since the
treaty did not extend the same absolute right of inheritability to
personal property 5 the statute was deemed controlling in this respect and the personal property of decedent escheated to the state.
In Zschernig v. Miller6 the United States Supreme Court reversed
this latter determination of the Oregon court, holding the state
statute totally invalid as an unconstitutional invasion of the federal power to determine foreign policy. Decedent's heirs in East
Germany were permitted to inherit both the real and personal
property of the intestate.
Under international law aliens have no right to claim an inheritance privilege in property located in another country, 7 and
in the United States it is within the power of the individual states
to grant or deny such right to citizens of foreign nations.8 At
common law an alien was allowed to take by grant or devise but
was refused any right to take by descent or inheritance. 9 As the
the rights of citizens of one nation to hold and transmit land within the
territory of the other pursuant to the treaty continues. Karnuth v. United
States, 279 U.S. 231 (1929). The treaty provision granting German nationals
inheritance rights in United States property is a common one. See, e.g.,
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961) (treaty with Serbia, presently
Yugoslavia); Mullart v. State Land Board, 222 Ore. 463, 353 P.2d 531 (1960)
(treaty with Estonia); Fredrickson v. Louisiana, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 577
(1860) (treaty with Wurttemberg).
3. Zschernig v. Miller, 243 Ore. 567, 412 P.2d 781 (1966).
4. The present impossibility of transferring the property to the heirs
results from the lack of diplomatic relations with the Soviet East German
government. Id. at 573, 412 P.2d 792-93. While an offer to place the funds
with a West German depository was refused, such requests have infrequently been granted where the statute is custodial as opposed to confiscatory. Lange Estate, 7 Fiduc. Rep. 257 (O.C. Pa. 1957).
5. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 514-18 (1947).
6. Zschernig v. Miller, 88 S. Ct. 664 (1968). Justice Douglas delivered
the majority opinion with a concurring opinion written by Justice Stewart
in which Justice Brennan joined. Justice Harlan concurred in the result
only, feeling it was unnecessary and undesirable to declare the Oregon
statute unconstitutional when other means of rendering the statute nugatory in this case were available. Justice Marshall took no part in the
determination of the case.
7. In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 161 P.2d 589 (Cal. App. 1945); 1 HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 203 (2d ed. 1945); 1 OPPENMHM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 321 (8th ed. 1955).
8. E.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1941); In re
Bevilacqua's Estate, 161 P.2d 589, 592-93 (Cal. App. 1945); In re Estate of
Perkins, 21 Cal. 2d 561, 134 P.2d 231, 236 (1943).
9. See cases cited in Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879);
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217 (1923); see also Heyman, The Nonresident Alien's Right To Succession Under The "Iron Curtain Rule," 52
Nw.U.L. REv. 221, 223 (1957).
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United States became more involved in international commerce
and communication, treaties were executed by the federal government which granted alien nationals succession rights.' 0 Such treaties are binding on the states and control in the event of conflict
with state law.'
Shortly before World War II, many states passed legislation to
prevent enemy or potential enemy nations from taking property
left by United States residents to foreign citizens. 12 Upon the
termination of hostilities, the acts remained in force and were fo10. Heyman, The Nonresident Alien's Right To Succession Under The
"Iron Curtain Rule," 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 221, 224 (1957).
11. E.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 190 (1961); United States
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-33 (1941) (executive agreement); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-74 (1941) (federal treaty or statute). These cases
declare treaties and executive agreements to be controlling under the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution which
reads:
[A]l1 Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the Supreme law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
The President is given the exclusive power to make treaties subject to
Senate approval. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
12. Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents Of Russia And Its Satellites To
Share In Estates Of American Decedents, 25 S. CAL. L. Rsv. 297, 298-310
(1952). These statutes fall into two general classifications; (1) reciprocity
statutes; and (2) benefit, use control or enjoyment statutes. A typical
reciprocity statute reads:
The right of aliens not residing within the United States or its
territories to take real property in this State by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the United States is dependent in each case
upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens
of the United States to take real property upon the same terms
and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective countries
of which such aliens are residents and the right of aliens not residing in the United States or its territories to take personal property
in this State by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the
same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the United
States is dependent in each case upon the existence of a reciprocal
right upon the part of citizens of the United States to take personal
property upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective countries of which such aliens are residents.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1957).
A typical benefit statute reads:
Whenever it shall appear to the court that if distribution were
made a beneficiary would not have the actual benefit, use, enjoyment or control of the money or other property distributed to him
by a fiduciary, the court shall have the power and authority to
direct the fiduciary (a) to make payment of the share of such
beneficiary at such times and in such manner and amounts as the
court may deem proper, or (b) to withhold distribution of the
share of such beneficiary, convert it to cash, and pay it through
the Department of Revenue into the State Treasury without
escheat.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 1156 (Supp. 1965); see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20
§ 320.737 (Supp. 1965) (Fiduciary Act). ORE. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1967).
The Oregon statute contains inter alia, both reciprocity and benefit provisions but it is generally classified as a reciprocity statute.
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cused with increasing frequency on the Soviet Union. The acts became known as the "Iron Curtain Statutes"' 8 and they were challenged in state and federal courts where their restrictive effect
was often negated by superseding treaties which did not contain
the "Iron Curtain" qualifications. 14 Where no superseding treaty
existed, however, or where such a treaty was of limited effect, the
Iron Curtain statutes were consistently declared constitutional by
state courts. 15 When finally called upon to determine the constitutionality of a reciprocity statute in Clark v. Allen,16 the Su13. See, e.g., Zupko Estate, 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 442-444 (O.C. Pa. 1958);
Jones, Iron Curtain Distributees: A Mounting Problem In Pennsylvania's
Orphans Courts, 69 DICK. L. REv. 227.
14. See note 12 supra.
15. E.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 243 Ore. 567, 412 P.2d 782 (1966). Before
the Oregon Supreme Court it was argued that the Oregon statute violated
U.S. CONST. art. I § 10 prohibiting states from entering into agreements or
compacts with foreign states and further that the statute was within the
treaty making power vested exclusively in the federal government under
U.S. CONST. art. VI. The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the argument
since the state statute did not conflict with any treaty or overriding federal
policy. In Zupko Estate, 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 442 (O.C. Pa. 1958), it was held
that Pennsylvania's alien property law does not violate treaty making
power of the federal government or impair the right of due process guaranteed to all persons in the United States by the fourteenth amendment,
since the statute is merely custodial and does not require the state courts
to sit in judgment of foreign countries. The Pennsylvania statute is set
out in note 13 supra; see In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 161 P.2d 589 (Cal. App.
1945), aff'd 31 Cal. 2d 580, 191 P.2d 752 (1948), where it was argued that
the California reciprocity statute was not a law of succession but rather
was intended to control the international transmission of property and
confiscation of enemy property. This argument was rejected on the ground
that the act on its face did not so imply, although admittedly an appending
"statement of urgency" did so intimate. 161 P.2d at 593-94. The California
statute is set out in note 13 supra; see also Terrance v. Thompson, 263 U.S.
197 (1923), where it was contended that the Washington Anti-Alien Land
Law violated the due process and equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. This argument was rejected by the Court. By withholding
from all aliens the right to own land within the state, the law was not
fostering a capricious or arbitrary deprivation of liberty or property. 263
U.S. at 218.
16. 331 U.S. 503 (1947). In this leading case it was argued that the
California reciprocity statute was an extension of state activity into the
field of foreign affairs since California, by offering reciprocal rights of
ownership to foreign nations, sought to promote the rights of American
citizens to own land abroad. The Supreme Court rejected the argument
as "far fetched" since there was no overriding federal policy in conflict
with the legislation as it pertained to personal property. The statute might

have only an incidental effect on foreign affairs. Id. at 516, 17. While the
Supreme Court in Zschernig refused to overrule any part of Clark, any
effect Clark had in supporting the constitutionality of reciprocity or benefit

legislation has decidedly been destroyed by the principal case. While
Clark was distinguished in Zschernig on the ground that Clark merely
stood for the proposition that the reciprocity statute on its face was not
unconstitutional, such a distinction hardly seems sufficient to warrant sustaining the Clark decision as the purpose of a statute and its constitutional
validity must be determined by its reasonable and natural effect. Chy
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preme Court upheld the state courts declaring that Iron Curtain
statutes had merely an indirect effect on foreign affairs and was
not an unconstitutional invasion of federal treaty making powers. If state courts had been hesitant in applying the provisions
of the Iron Curtain Statutes prior to Clark, the decisions decided
transfer of property to althereafter increasingly restricted the
17
iens living behind the Iron Curtain.
In Zschernig the Supreme Court abandoned its earlier rationale
that conflict with treaty or declared foreign policy would negate the effect of state reciprocity statutes."' Instead the court
held the Oregon statute to be an unconstitutional invasion into the
field of foreign affairs. 19 Judicial inquiry by state courts into the
governmental structure of Soviet countries constituted the prohibited invasion. Such inquiry amounts to each state determining
foreign policy on an ad hoc basis. 20

Further prohibited intrusion

into foreign affairs is also found in the statute's interference with
the international transmission of property funds, credits and captured enemy property.21 Restricting the flow of moneys to Soviet
nationals is further prohibited because of the potential dangers of
Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876); Henderson & Wickham Comrs. v.
North German Lloyd, 92 U.S. 259 (1876). The Clark decision, at least
with respect to its finding that the California statute was constitutional,
should have been overruled by the court in Zschernig to remove possible
confusion.
17. Zschernig v. Miller, 88 S. Ct. at 668 n.6.
18. Justice Harlan, concurring only in the result of the majority,
advocated deciding the case on the narrower ground that the statute was
in conflict with the treaty with Germany, see note 7 supra. Since Clark
had held the treaty inapplicable as to personal property, Justice Harlan
argued the Clark decision should be overruled on this point. 88 S. Ct. at
672-682.
19. Zschernig v. Miller, 88 S. Ct. at 666. For authority the single case
of Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) was cited. Hines held the
Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act invalid since a subsequently passed
Federal registration act exclusively preempted the field under the treaty
making power which was vested in the executive by the Constitution.
Hines proceeded on the theory that alien registration was exclusively
vested in the federal government. The implication in Zschernig is that
legislation restricting the rights of alien nationals to receive and hold land
in any state by whatever means is also an exclusive federal power within
its treaty making function as determined by the Constitution. Even in the
absence of a treaty or executive agreement the states have no right to
legislate in the area of foreign affairs. See Zschernig v. Miller, 88 S. Ct.
at 672 (J. Stewart's concurring opinion).
20. There is little doubt from a reading of cases decided subsequent
to the passage of the Iron Curtain Statutes that their inquiries were often
corrupted by biased and oftentimes erroneous conceptions of Soviet law
and its efficacy. This is amply illustrated by cases cited throughout
Zschernig. See 88 S. Ct. at 667-671. For an objective look at Russian
property law see Berman, Soviet Heirs In American Courts, 62 COLUM. L.
REv. 257 (1962).
21. Zschernig v. Miller, 88 S. Ct. at 667, quoting from the argument
advanced by the United States in In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 161 P.2d 589
(Cal. App. 1945), afj'd 31 Cal. 2d 580, 191 P.2d 752 (1948).
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international affront and controversy resulting from legislation directly affecting foreign citizens. 22 Finally, the states' traditional right to regulate the descent and distribution of estates is
23
subservient to the effective exercise of national foreign policy
even in absence of a treaty, 24 and there can be no state law interpower of the federal government in
fering with the exclusive
25
international affairs.

From the tenor of the Zschernig opinion, it seems uncontro-

vertible that all Iron Curtain legislation requiring either proof of
reciprocity between countries or use, benefit, control or enjoyment
by the foreign heir is invalid inasmuch as it impels forbidden inquiry in foreign governmental administration and results in the
26
The deformulation of foreign policy by the individual states.
cision will undoubtedly result in backclaims by or on behalf of

foreign heirs who were previously denied property by Iron Curtain statute requirements.

This would be true whether the state

27
ultimately took the property by escheat or by impoundment.

22. Zschernig v. Miller, 88 S. Ct. at 669-671.
23. Cases cited in note 9 supra.
24. Zschernig v. Miller, 88 S. Ct. at 671. The recognition of controlling
foreign policy even in absence of a treaty is well established. Bethelehem
Steel v. New York Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947); Cloverleaf
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203 (1941); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
25. Zschernig v. Miller, 88 S. Ct. at 672 (J. Stewart's concurring opinion). In the absence of a conflicting federal policy or violation of the
express mandates of the Constitution, the states may legislate in areas of
their traditional competence, even though their statutes may have an incidental effect on foreign relations. Id. at 680 (J. Harlan concurring in
result). See, e.g., Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Terrace v. ThompThe effect on foreign affairs from a judicial
son, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
determination of the right to receive land or its proceeds by a citizen of
a foreign nation is sufficient to put the activity into the arena of foreign
policy determination exclusively vested in the Executive. Zschernig v.
Miller, 88 S. Ct. at 672 (J. Stewart's concurring opinion).
26. While most of the Court's discussion discredited the reciprocity
provisions of the Oregon statute, the Court unequivocally stated that all
sections of the statute are unconstitutional. Zschernig v. Miller, 88 S. Ct.
at 668. Any argument sustaining the unconstitutional effects of a reciprocity statute may equally be maintained against a benefit statute since identical inquiries and considerations are necessary. See Berman, Soviet Heirs
In American Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 268 (1962). The Pennsylvania
Iron Curtain legislation which would logically be rendered nugatory by
Zschernig is: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 320.737 (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20 § 1156 (Supp. 1965). In addition, court procedural rules establishing
criteria for determination of benefit, use, enjoyment or control are also
void of utility. See, e.g., PENNA. SUPER. CT. O.C. RULES § 13; PHILADELPHIA
COUNTY ORPHANS CT. R. § 69.6. During the publication stages of this issue,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 320.737 (Sup. 1965) (Fiduciary Act of 1949), and
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 1156 (Supp. 1965) were declared unconstitutional in
Struchmanczuk Estate (No. 2), 18 Fiduc. Rep. 186 (O.C. Pa. 1968) interpreting the Zschernig decision.
27. Smith, Foreign Distributees-"IronCurtain Acts"-Intrusion in Foreign Affairs, FIDUCIARY REV., March, 1968 at 2.
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While Zschernig has lessened the task of the foreign heir or
his representative in recovering decedents' property, it does not
completely remove all burdens of proof placed on such parties by
state regulation. For example, even prior to the establishment of
Iron Curtain qualifications, the state courts consistently required
a representative of an alien to establish his power of attorney.2
The kinship of an alien heir in cases of intestacy, 9 and the existence and identity of the heir "10 are also usual matters of proof
necessary to establish a valid claim to property left by a decedent
in the United States.3 1 Such qualifications are unaffected by
Zschernig since these judicial inquiries are more objective and reasonable. Inquiry into these matters of proof would appear to proceed from a state's right and duty to guarantee a just distribution of an estate, nevertheless, any unreasonable burden of proof
placed on foreign heirs may result in a charge of unconstitutional
interference with foreign affairs.
In summary, Zschernig holds that any state legislation which
denies the right to property or its proceeds to any alien heir based
on political determinations of foreign governmental administration by the state judiciary is an unconstitutional invasion of the exclusive federal power over foreign affairs. However, the states
still maintain controls over such property by other regulated matters of proof required of alien heirs. It is submitted that the removal of Iron Curtain qualifications will undoubtedly result in a
more just distribution of United States property to foreign heirs.
CHARLES F. WMSON

28. See, e.g., Bokey Estate, 412 Pa. 244, 194 A.2d 194 (1963); Sutkowski
Estate, 10 Fiduc. Rep. 498 (O.C. Pa. 1960).
29. See, e.g., Garret Estate, 371 Pa. 284, 89 A.2d 531 (1952); Link's
Estate (No. 1) 319 Pa. 513, 180 A. 1 (1935); Szczepanski Estate, 33 Pa. D. &
C.2d 373 (Orphan's Ct. 1964).
30. See, e.g., Martinzik Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 701 (O.C. Pa. 1962);
Crawford Estate, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 709 (O.C. Pa. 1958).
31. For a good discussion of the application of such requirements in
Pennsylvania see Jones, Iron Curtain Distributees: A Mounting Problem
In Pennsylvania's Orphans' Courts, 69 DICK. L. REV. 227 (1965).

EVIDENCE-EXCLUSIONARY RULE-SHOULD THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE BE EXTENDED TO
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT OFFICERS?
United States v. Stonehill, 274 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1967)
In United States v. Stonehill' the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California reluctantly held that evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure by foreign
government officers was admissible in United States courts. The
decision denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence 2 was
rendered solely because the court felt bound by Brulay v. United
States.3 In Brulay the ninth circuit upheld the admissibility of
evidence obtained by Mexican police who arrested the defendant
without a warrant and without probable cause.
The Stonehill court's obvious sentiment for excluding the illegally obtained evidence highlights an evidentiary conflict within
our courts. Defendant Stonehill operated a prosperous business in
the Philippines which had come to the attention of both the
United States Internal Revenue Service and Philippine authorities.
His tax return had been sent for audit to the I.R.S. representative
in the Philippines at the same time as the Philippine National Bureau of Investigation was gathering evidence to be used in deportation proceedings against the defendant as an undesirable
alien. A former employee of the defendant brought documents
purporting to show illegal activities of the defendant's corporation
to the attention of the I.R.S. agent. Upon taking the information
to the Philippine authorities, the I.R.S. agent learned that they
were planning a raid to gather further information about the defendant. He declined to participate in the raid, but he copied
numerous documents and records which the Philippine authorities
had seized. This evidence was introduced against the defendant by
the Philippines in deportation proceedings and by the United
States in a tax deficiency case.
The defendant filed suit in the Philippine courts demanding the
return and suppression of this evidence on the basis that it was
seized under unlawful search warrants. The Philippine Supreme
Court found the warrants to be illegal and void, and ordered the
evidence suppressed. 4 In the tax action, the district court studied
the warrants and agreed that there was no question that the
1.
2.
3.
4.

274 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
Id.
383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967).
Stonehill v. Diokno, C.R. No. L-19550.
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warrants would be void under federal law if they had been used by
federal agents for search and seizure. The fact that the illegal
search and seizure had been made by foreign government officers
raised a more complex problem.
Historically, all competent and relevant evidence was admissible regardless of the manner in which it was obtained. 5 Boyd
v. United States6 created the first form of a constitutional exclusionary rule. Weeks v. United States 7 made evidence illegally obtained by federal officers inadmissible in federal criminal cases.
Following Weeks, federal courts adopted the Silver Platter Doctrine
whereby evidence gathered by state officers in violation of fourth
amendment standards for federal officers was admissible in federal courts as long as federal officers played no part in obtaining
the evidence.8 Elkins v. United States9 abandoned this doctrine
and held that it made no difference whether the evidence was
gathered by state or federal officers if the method of obtaining
the evidence violated the fourth amendment and it was being offered in federal court. 10 Mapp v. Ohio" extended the exclusionary
rule in criminal cases by overruling the Supreme Court of Ohio
in a state case holding that evidence unconstitutionally obtained
5. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
6. 116 U.S. 616 (1885). The court felt that compulsory production
of records was the equivalent of an illegal search and seizure and that
admission of evidence thus obtained would violate both the fourth and
fifth amendments.
7. 232 U.S. 383 (1913). The court said:
If letters and private documents can thus [illegally] be seized and
held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be

secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so

far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken
from the Constitution.
Id. at 393. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124
(1932); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Amos v. United States,
255 U.S. 313 (1920); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1920); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1919).
8. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1948); Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487 (1943); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1926).
9. 364 U.S. 206 (1959).
10. After noting that many states had adopted exclusionary rules of
their own, the court said:
[W]hen a federal court sitting in an exclusionary state admits evidence lawlessly seized by state agents, it not only frustrates state
policy, but frustrates that policy in a particularly inappropriate
and ironic way. For by admitting the unlawfully seized evidence

the federal court serves to defeat the state's effort to assure obedi-

ence to the Federal Constitution. In states which have not adopted

the [E]xclusionary [R]ule, on the other hand, it would work no
conflict with local policy for a federal court to decline to receive
evidence unlawfully seized by state officers.

364 U.S. at 221.

11. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

The court felt that the basic rights of the

individual under the fourth amendment would be violated if federal courts

admitted evidence gathered in illegal searches and seizures by the states.
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by state officers was inadmissible in state courts.
In civil actions the exclusionary rule has not been as widely
12
accepted as it has in criminal cases. Del Presto v. Del Presto
held that the exclusionary rule does apply to civil cases, while
Sackler v. Sackler 13 holds that it does not. The dispute arises out
of uncertainty concerning whether Elkins v. United States14 effectively overruled Burdeau v. McDowell.'5 Although the dispute
has not been conclusively settled, 16 it does not directly affect
the principal case. Stonehill cannot be distinguished on the basis
that it is a civil case, for the court expressly states: "Ordinarily
the question of search and seizure arises in criminal prosecutions,
but this court sees no reason for not also applying the rule in civil
17
actions.'
The difference of opinion over whether or not the exclusionary
rule should apply to evidence illegally obtained by foreign officials
which is expressed in Stonehill and Brulay is a result of a dual
line of reasoning which has developed from the application of the
exclusionary rule. Stonehill follows the line of reasoning that the
exclusionary rule is designed to preclude from federal courts all
evidence not gathered by constitutional means.' 8 Brulay follows
the line of reasoning that the exclusionary rule was developed to
protect United States citizens from illegal acts of federal officers by
excluding illegally obtained evidence to punish the officer.' 9 There12. 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (Chancery Div. 1966).
13. 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481 (1964).
14. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
15. 256 U.S. 465 (1921), wherein it was held that the unlawful seizure of papers by a private corporation did not violate the fourth amendment.
16. For a more complete discussion of this problem see Note, 43 N.C.
L. REv. 608 (1965); Note, 71 DICK. L. REV. 374 (1967).
17. 274 F. Supp. at 425.
18. 274 F. Supp. at 425-26. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364 (1964). The court said: "The question whether evidence obtained by
state officers and used against a defendant in a federal trial was obtained
by unreasonable search and seizure is to be judged as if the search and
seizure had been made by federal officers." Id.at 336; Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1962). The court said: "Nor do the policies underlying the exclusionary rule invite any logical distinction between physical
and verbal evidence. Either in terms of deterring lawless conduct by federal officers, or of closing the doors of the federal courts to any use of
evidence unconstitutionally obtained. . .

."

Id. at 486 (citations omitted);

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1959). Elkins held that evidence
illegally gathered by state officers could not be used in federal court
stating: "[E)vidence obtained by state officers during a search which, if
conducted by federal officers, would have violated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible. . .

19.

."

Id. at 223.

The court said:
The Fourth Amendment is directed at the Federal Government
and its agencies. Fourth Amendment rights are protected from
state encroachments by the Fourteenth Amendment which reaches
the states and their agencies. The Fourth Amendment does not,
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fore, when the acts of federal officers in no way contribute to the
illegal gathering of evidence, that evidence should not be barred
by the exclusionary rule.20
Authority to support both positions may be found with little
21
difficulty and both rationales have appeared in the same case.
Extension of the exclusionary rule to include evidence gathered
by its language, require the exclusion of evidence and the exclu-

sionary rule announced in Weeks is a court-created prophylaxis
designed to deter federal officers from violating the Fourth Amendment. Neither the Fourth nor the Fourteenth Amendments are
directed at Mexican officials and no prophylactic purpose is served
by applying an exclusionary rule here since what we do will not
alter the search policies of the sovereign Nation of Mexico.
383 F.2d at 348.
20. 383 F.2d at 348.
21. For language which supports Stonehill see Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1913). "If letters and private documents can thus [illegally]
be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be
secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution." Id. at 393; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1948). "Courts
can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly and through
the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those who frequently
are guilty." Id. at 181; Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949). "In my
opinion the important consideration is the presence of an illegal search.
Whether state or federal officials did the searching is of no consequence to
the defendant. . .

."

Id. at 80; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1959):

To the victim it matters not whether his constitutional right has
been invaded by a federal agent or by a state officer. It would be
a curiously ambivalent rule that would require the courts of the
United States to differentiate between unconstitutionally seized
evidence upon so arbitrary a basis. Such a distinction indeed
would appear to reflect an indefensibly selective evaluation of the
provisions of the Constitution.
Id. at 215.
For language which supports Brulay see Rea v. United States, 350 U.S.
214 (1955):
The obligation of the federal agent is to obey the Rules. They are
drawn for innocent and guilty alike. They prescribe standards for
law enforcement. They are designed to protect the privacy of the
citizen, unless the strict standards set for searches and seizures are
satisfied. That policy is defeated if the federal agent can flout
them and use the fruits of his unlawful act either in federal or
state proceedings.
Id. at 217-18; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1959): "If . . . it is
understood that the fruit of an unlawful search by state agents will be
inadmissible in a federal trial, there can be no inducement to subterfuge
and evasion with respect to federal-state cooperation in criminal investigation." Id. at 222; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960):
[W]e can no longer permit it [the right not to be subject to illegal
search and seizure] to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend
its enjoyment.

Our decision . . . gives to the individual no more

than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police
officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is
entitled.
Id. at 660; People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585 (1926): "[T]he
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." Id. at 587.
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by state officials 22 and its extension to include evidence gathered
by private individuals, 23 seems to support the Stonehill position.
The exclusionary rule, however, is a court made rule. Under present law, both the Stonehill and Brulay positions may be supported. As suggested by Stonehill, until the United States Supreme Court expressly rules on the question, it is unclear whether
or not the exclusionary rule should be applied to evidence obtained by foreign officers in violation of our own constitutional
standards.
SAMUEL A. ScoTT

22.
23.
(1966).

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960).
See Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: CONTRACTOR'S
OBLIGATION TO ALLOW EXAMINATION OF
RECORDS UNDER 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b)
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 385 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1967)
A recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is significant due to the potential repercussions which it may
cause in the field of government contracting. In Hewlett-Packard
Co. v. United States1 the Comptroller General of the United States
brought an action to enforce his alleged right to examine the
company's books and records. The government had four firm fixedprice contracts 2 with the defendant for equipment purchased by
the Air Force. The items were all standard products which had
been sold for a period of years on the general market. In addition,
they had been listed in Hewlett-Packard's catalogue for a substantial length of time. Since all the products involved in the four contracts were considered to be standard commercial items the Air
Force purchased the items at their catalogue prices less a volume
discount. The negotiations for the discount were the only ones involved in the transactions. These negotiations, however, brought
the contracts under 10 U.S.C. 2301-2314 concerning procurement for
the military and is the statute upon which the Government based
its demand for examination of the company's cost and profit data.
Specifically, the government based its argument on section 2313(b)
of title 10 which provides that:
Each contract negotiated under this chapter shall provide that the Comptroller General and his representatives
are entitled, until the expiration of three years after final
payment, to examine any books, documents, papers, or records of the contractor, or any of his sub-contractors, that
1. 385 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 1184 (1968).
2. The following definition of this term is found in the Code of Federal Regulations:
§ 3.404-2 Firm fixed-price contract.
(a) Description. The firm fixed-price contract provides for
a price which is not subject to any adjustment by reason of the cost
experience of the contractor, in the performance of the contract.
(b) Application. The firm fixed-price contract is suitable
when reasonably definite design or performance specifications are
available and whenever fair and reasonable prices can be established at the outset such as where:
(1) Adequate competition has made initial proposals
effective;
The firm fixed-price contract is particularly suitable in the purchase of standard or modified commercial items .

sound prices can be developed.
32 C.F.R. § 3.404-2 (1968).

.

. for which
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directly pertain to, and involve transactions relating to,
the contract or subcontract.3
Pursuant to this clause, each of the contracts contained the following language:
10. Examination of Records.
(a) The contractor [Hewlett-Packard Company]
agrees that the Comptroller General of the United
States .

.

. shall .

.

. have access to and the right to

examine any directly pertinent books, documents, painvolving transacpers, and records of the Contractor
4
tions related to this contract.
The issue of the case was whether the statute should be given a
broad or narrow interpretation. Is data concerning production
costs and profits directly pertinent and sufficiently related to contracts of the type in Hewlett-Packard to give the government the
right under section 2313 (b) to examine such data?
The district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment holding that such items as direct material, direct
labor, and overhead costs were directly pertinent to the contracts.
The court ordered Hewlett-Packard to make this information available. 5 The ninth circuit affirmed, holding that the information
referred to in 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) and the contract clauses, was
not limited to the specific terms and conditions of the contracts per
se, but that:
[T]he word "contract," as used in this statute is intended
to have a broader meaning, embracing not only specific
terms and conditions, but also the general subject matter.
The subject matter of these four contracts is the procurement of described property by the government. 6
The court then reached the obvious conclusion that production
costs are directly pertinent to procurement in general.
Hewlett-Packard is a unique application of the familiar power
of government control over those with whom it contracts. This
control, of course, is grounded on the policy that because the public interest is at stake and public funds are being expended, the
contractor must not be permitted to gain exhorbitant profits. Consequently, those who deal with the government are subject to a
number of regulations, such as the one involved in Hewlett-Packard.
Section 2313(b) is the codification of a 1951 congressional act
which provides:
All contracts negotiated without advertising pursuant
3. Armed Forces Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1964). (Emphasis added).
4. Brief for Plaintiff at 3, United States v. Hewlett-Packard, Civil
No. 48118 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 1966).
5. United States v. Hewlett-Packard, Civil No. 41281 (N.D. Cal. June
27, 1966).
6. 385 F.2d at 1016.
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to authority contained in this Act shall include a clause to
the effect that the Comptroller General of the United
States or any of his duly authorized representatives shall
until the expiration of three years after final payment
have access to and the right to examine any directly pertinent books, documents, papers, and records of the contractor or any of his subcontractors engaged in the performance of and involving transactions related to such
contracts or subcontracts. 7
There is no specific delineation of what is considered to be
"directly pertinent" in either the original act or the codified revision. The Senate Report on Public Law 2458 noted the usefulness
in certain situations of negotiating contracts without formal advertising and, consequently, the need for regulations governing such
contracts. The legislative history of the act, unfortunately, does
not distinguish between fully negotiated contracts and contracts
similar to those in Hewlett-Packard. There, the only negotiation
was on the quantity discount and no inquiry was ever made concerning cost and profit data prior to the execution and performance
of the contract. Perhaps a significant indication of the intended
purpose of this particular legislation is found in a comment by
Congressman Celler:
As I understand the Hardy amendment, the powers
given are like a Damoclean sword that will hang over
the heads of the contractors whose contracts are changed.
The amendment will give power to the General Accounting Office to go into the books and delve into the records
of these contractors who have been relieved to determine
whether or not there is fraud or overreaching or whether
they have done anything untoward, in which event reports
will be made and suitable action may be taken. The power
of investigation and inquiry of the General Accounting Office should be an excellent deterrent.9
In its decision, the ninth circuit rejected Hewlett-Packard's
contention that the lower court's decision ignored the words of
limitation contained in the statute and the contract, and that
consequently any and all books and records were fair game for
government examination. The court noted that the district court
limited such examination to records "relating to the cost of producing the items furnished by Hewlett-Packard Company under
the aforesaid contracts, including costs of direct material, direct
labor and overhead costs."' 1
7. Act of October 31, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-245, 65 Stat. 700.
8. S.REP. No. 603 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
9. 96 CONG. REC. 17123 (1951); this statement was made concerning
another piece of legislation which had similar language and purpose to
Public Law 245 (emphasis added). A summary of this legislative history
can be found in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2569 (1951).
10. United States v. Hewlett-Packard, Civil No. 41881 (N.D. Cal., June
27, 1966).
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The circuit court looked at the scope of interpretation of the
word "contract" contained in section 2313(b) as the key in determining the applicability of the limitation language in the statute. It agreed that if "contract" is limited to the terms and conditions of the agreement, cost data would be outside the scope of the
contracts in Hewlett-Packard. Such costs were not taken into
consideration during the formation of the contract, but, in fact
were specifically excluded." But the court went on to find that
this term was intended to have a much broader significance within
12
the statute and that it included "the general subject matter."'
As was mentioned at the outset, this focus led quite naturally to
the conclusion that production costs are directly pertinent to the
general subject of procurement.
It was admitted by the court 13 that the primary reason for obtaining the information in question was not to determine whether
the four contracts had been properly and fairly executed by
Hewlett-Packard. It was therefore necessary for the court to
consider whether the purpose of section 2313(b) was indeed broader.
The government alleged that the legislative history and plain
meaning of the statute clearly demonstrated that another purpose
of the statute was to aid the government in evaluating and improving its procurement program. Hewlett-Packard argued that
the purpose of 2313(b) was solely to police the contract per se.
In rejecting this latter contention the court said it found nothing
in the wording of the statute itself or in the legislative history
which would so limit its applicability. According to the court,
"[I]f such a limited scope of examination had been intended by
Congress it would have found the means to so indicate. ' 14 The
court therefore affirmed the lower court ruling which granted examination rights to the government.
It is submitted that the court's interpretation of section 2313
(b) both as to its meaning and purpose is strained. There can be
no argument with the need for a means of supervision over negotiated contracts. This is especially true in the case of "cost and
cost plus" 15 contracts where close scrutiny of the contractor's pro11. This aspect of the case is explained by the following portion of
the decision:
The Government's Request for Proposal which was incorporated
into the contract contained a form statement of additional terms
and conditions, but only the clauses checked by the Government
were to be applicable. One clause, entitled "Cost Data Information," called for the seller to provide the Government with detailed
data concerning such cost items as material, labor and overhead.
However, this clause was not checked and was therefore not
applicable.
385 F.2d 1014 (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 1016.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. For definitions of these contracts see 32 C.F.R. § 3405 (1968).
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duction costs is essential to insuring a fair contract. However,
the contracts in Hewlett-Packard were of a much different nature.
The desired protection was afforded by competitive market forces.
That the Government recognized this situation is demonstrable
since the items sold under the contracts were considered to be
"standard commercial items" under the Renegotiation Act of 1951.16
They were mandatorily exempt from renegotiation to determine
any excess profit making. This was apparently within the knowledge of the court as the opinion contains a reference to Senate Report 64317 which explains the reason why the exemption was made
mandatory: "The committee believes that in the case of standard
commercial articles there is in most cases no basis or need for renegotiation since cost and pricing experience has already been
acquired and prices made in a competitive market."'8
Consequently, for the purposes of the Renegotiation Act cost data was
not pertinent. At the time of negotiations the government obviously did not consider production costs to be pertinent since
they made no effort to obtain such information and in fact made
such inquiry inapplicable to the contracts. Within the context of
these factors, it is submitted that cost data was never very pertinent to the four contracts between the Air Force and HewlettPackard.
It is difficult to justify the court's agreement with the government's contention that the purposes of section 2313(b) included
the improvement of procurement procedures. Although it is true
that there is nothing in the Act specifically negating this idea, it is
also true that there is nothing which would indicate an intention
on the part of Congress that it should be so utilized. In fact, the
words of Congressman Celler previously quoted from the legislative history of § 2313(b) would seem to indicate that the purpose was solely to provide a method to discover fraudulent activities and not a means by which government agencies can improve their procurement techniques for use in future contracts.
It seems appropriate to suggest that the decision will cause many
potential government contractors to hesitate to deal with the
government on standard items if open inspection of their books
is threatened.
WILLIS A. SIEGFRIED,

16. 50 U.S.C. § 1216(e) (1964).
17. 385 F.2d at 1014 and n.2.
18. Id.

JR.

FEDERAL PROCEDURE-ELIGIBILITY OF FEDERAL
COURTS TO HEAR DIVORCE CASES
Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
A United States district court recently took jurisdiction over a
divorce case, and thereby broke a tradition as old as American law.
Judge Jack B. Weinstein, of the Eastern District Court in Brooklyn,
held in Spindel v. Spindel1 that all the requisites for federal jurisdiction were met 2 and that "[t] he mere fact that a matter is one
which has traditionally been of state concern is not sufficient to
justify abstention."3
The plaintiff Mrs. Eleanor Carson Spindel presently resides in
New Mexico while her husband lives in New York. The couple
were married in Connecticut in 1965. Mrs. Spindel alleged in her
complaint that her husband fraudulently induced her to marry
him, and then refused to live with her and support her as he had
promised. As a result, she moved to New Mexico. She further
alleged that her husband coerced her to consent to a divorce, which
he obtained in Mexico in 1967. Mrs. Spindel asked the district court
to declare the Mexican divorce decree invalid and to award her
$500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Defendant moved
to have the case dismissed on the ground that federal courts lack
jurisdiction in matrimonial cases. Judge Weinstein denied the
motion and accepted jurisdiction.
Federal courts have long refused to hear divorce cases, though
more because of tradition than because of any foundation in statute or precedent. Historically, it was felt that equity jurisdiction
of the federal courts was co-extensive with the jurisdiction of the
English Court of Chancery, and since the English Chancery had no
power over divorce or alimony, neither did the federal courts. 4 In
England, it was Parliament which dealt with divorces-although
church courts could grant separation decrees. When this country
was settled, the individual legislatures followed the English example, and the subject of divorce thus developed within the exclusive realm of the states.5
1. 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).

2. Requisites for federal jurisdiction are: (a) a civil action, involving (b) a controversy, (c) exceeding the value of $10,000, (d) between
citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
3. 283 F. Supp. at 811.
4. See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 605 (1859)
(dissent); Fontain v. Ravenal, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 392-93 (1855) (concurring opinion).
5. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1888); see generally

2

SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS, at

1724 (6th ed. 1921).
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The practice of federal abstention in divorce cases, based so
long only on tradition, was supported by a Supreme Court declaration in 1859. In Barberv. Barber,6 the Court stated by dictum:
We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the
United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in
chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one
from bed and board.7
The statement was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Simms v.
Simms8 in 1899, and in De La Rama v. De La Rama 9 in 1906.
These two cases involved appeals from divorce and alimony decrees by federal territorial courts. A similar ruling was made by
the Supreme Court in 1890 in In re Burrus:10 "The whole subject
of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of
the United States."" In 1930, the Court re-affirmed its position
by refusing to uphold a federal court's divorce decree between the
Vice Counsul
of Rumania and his wife in Ohio ex Tel. Popovici v.
12
Alger.
Judge Weinstein, in the Spindel opinion, first refuted the
historical argument for federal abstention from divorce, and then
showed that the Supreme Court cases did not apply to Spindel.
The English Chancery courts were not so inactive and powerless
in matrimonial affairs as is commonly thought. They heard
many cases in which divorce was an ancilliary issue and they
assisted and reviewed ecclesiastical courts in separation cases. 3 He
further noted that just because Parliament had exclusive control of
divorces in England did not mean that the matter was strictly
legislative. The English were not so concerned with notions of separation of powers as we are in America today; they often blended
legislative and judicial powers into one institution. 4 Finally,
courts should not be so intent on basing Twentieth Century divorce
policies on Eighteenth Century notions. There was nothing like
the modern concept of secular divorce in England in 1789; marriage
was considered to be indissoluable, with absolute divorces only obtainable by acts of Parliament."
As for the Supreme Court's declarations, Judge Weinstein indicated they have been consistently misinterpreted and misapplied.
The Barber case,' 6 which has become best known for its disclaimer
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
Id. at 584.
175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899).
201 U.S. 303, 304 (1906).
136 U.S. 586 (1890).
Id. at 593-94.
280 U.S. 379 (1930).
283 F. Supp. at 806-09.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 802-03.
62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
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proposition quoted above,' 7 actually held that a district court did
have jurisdiction to enforce a state court's separation and alimony
decree.18 The Court's disclaimer statement was "unnecessary to
its decision," according to Judge Weinstein. 19 Furthermore, the
statement was made without any cited authority. Yet it has been
repeated many times, and forms the foundation of the case law
against federal handling of divorce cases. In both the Simms and
De La Rama cases, the Supreme Court opened with the familiar
Barber disclaimer of federal jurisdiction, then turned around and
reviewed two divorce decrees by territorial courts. 20 Judge Weinstein reasoned that the Supreme Court's reviewal of divorce decisions by territorial courts suggests that all divorce decisions-including those of state and foreign courts-are within the federal
judicial review power. 21 The New York judge
distinguished the
22
Burrus and Popovici cases on a factual basis.

Apparently, the Spindel court would not be opposed to federal
courts accepting all types of divorce cases, even on an original basis,
so long as the requisite diversity of citizenship and $10,000 money
value were present. However, while the federal government may
have the power to handle such cases, national legislative policy
17. Note 7 supra.
18. The Supreme Court held the District Court of Wisconsin had jurisdiction in a suit by Mrs. Barber living in New York against her husband
living in Wisconsin to enforce a New York State court decree granting her
a separation and alimony. The Court's famous disclaimer of jurisdiction
statement actually was made in response to the dissenting justices' expressed fear that federal courts were going too far in matrimonial matters.
The majority apparently meant by its statement that federal courts do not
have power to grant divorce or alimony decrees, but they do have power
to enforce or invalidate existing decrees from state courts. This interpretation is supported by the Court's action in the case. However, the
sweeping words used by the Court to explain its position were poorlychosen-leaving the impression that the majority disavowed federal jurisdiction in all cases involving divorce matters.
19. 283 F. Supp. at 801.
20. In Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162 (1899), the Court reviewed a
divorce and alimony decree by the territorial supreme court of Arizona; in
De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303 (1906), the Court reviewed evidence respecting adultery of both parties and decided that a Philippines
territorial court was right in granting the wife a divorce.
21. 283 F. Supp. at 804.
22. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890), involved the question of a district court's power under the habeas corpus statutes to make an award of
an infant's custody in the absence of diversity jurisdiction. Judge Weinstein said the case's statement on the subject of divorce (quoted supra at
p. 693) did not refer to the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts,
but rather to the legislative power of the federal government to lay down
substantive rules of law in the domestic relations area. Spindel v. Spindel,
283 F. Supp. 797, 804 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
In Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930), the Supreme
Court refused jurisdiction because the requisite diversity was lacking and
because a divorce was being sought, not merely a ruling on the validity of
an existing divorce. See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 805 (E.D.N.Y.
1968).
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and tradition will prevent them from doing so.23 Nevertheless,
there is a special factor in the Spindel case which may permit that
opinion to stand up against any appellate attacks. Mrs. Spindel
was not asking a federal court to grant her a divorce, but merely to
declare an existing divorce invalid. She claimed Mr. Spindel fraudulently induced her to marry him and then coerced her to consent to a Mexican divorce. Therefore, the Mexican divorce decree
can be regarded as an ancillary matter with fraud and coercement
being the primary issue. There is considerable authority for a
federal court accepting a case viewed in this more narrow man24
ner. In Estate of Borax v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
a federal court determined the validity of a divorce for tax purposes; in Barret v. Failing25 a federal court ruled on a divorce as a
bar to dower interest; and in Holm v. Shilensky26 a federal court
examined a property settlement incorporated into a divorce decree. Judge Weinstein cited27 a series of federal cases with facts
even more similar to Spindel.
When the Spindel case is viewed in this more narrow mannernot as a federal divorce case, but as a case where a federal court is
examining an existing divorce-then the decision does not seem at
all radical. However, other courts may fear that an acceptance of
the Spindel opinion may open the door to federal courts' handling
of all types of divorce cases, including the granting of divorce
decrees. For this reason, the Spindel opinion may not gain wide
popularity and if appealed, may be overruled.
EDWARD J. BENETT

23. 283 F. Supp. at 803.
24. 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965).
25. 111 U.S. 523 (1884).
26. 388 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1968).
27. See, e.g., Terry v. Sharon, 131 U.S. 40 (1888) (suit to annul a written declaration of marriage because of a forged instrument, held "prima
facie case of jurisdiction"); Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 896 (1954) (action to declare Mexican divorce
invalid); Cohen v. Randall, 137 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 796 (1943) (action for alleged fraudulent representations made by
former spouse which induced plaintiff to enter into separation agreement
and divorce); Oxley v. Sweetland, 94 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1938) (question
whether plaintiff had married deceased in action to recover personal property): "The fact of marriage is a necessary issue in this suit . . .; but the
purpose of the suit is, not to establish the marriage, but to determine the
right to property claimed." Id. at 35; Barnett v. United States, 82 F.2d 765
(9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 546 (1936) (action where government
sought to have ward's marriage declared void): "[T]he remedy sought
...was ancillary to the main purpose of this action." Id. at 769; McNeil
v. McNeil, 78 F. 834 (N.D. Cal. 1897), afl'd, 170 F. 289 (9th Cir. 1909) (suit
to have divorce judgment annuled because of fraud):
Here there is no question if parties may be divorced or must forever remain together,-no question of the grounds of divorce. It
is a question purely of chancery jurisdiction. For what the judgment was rendered is not essential. It is that it was obtained by
fraud, and hence unjust to hold and use, and, because it is, the
court has jurisdiction.
Id. at 835; see generally, Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 810-11 (1968).
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